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Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled 
with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the 
governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus 
on the demands of ‘taking back control’ and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key 
drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than 
reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of ‘synergistic’ 
bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic 
sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would 
walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they 
inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity 
– and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements.
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Introduction
The United Kingdom’s protracted withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has brought 
countless surprises over the years. From Cameron’s announcement of an in/out referen-
dum in 2013 to the shock decision of the British public to leave the Union in June 2016, 
and from Theresa May’s ‘hard’ interpretation of the Brexit mandate to the unprecedented 
rejection of her Withdrawal Agreement in early 2019, the Brexit process has seldom been 
smooth. Taken together, these distinct moments have also revealed a deeper and more 
puzzling process of hardening preferences in which concerns about the United Kingdom’s 
position in the EU have morphed into sustained support for a clearer break with the EU 
among key public and elite constituencies. Explanations for this rightward shift have 
focused either on the incompatibility of British demands for ‘taking back control’ with 
core principles of European integration, such that a shift towards a ‘harder’ outcome was 
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always on the cards (e.g. Donnelly, 2018; Oliver, 2017; Rogers, 2019), or on the role of 
domestic factors such as May’s status as an insecure Remain supporter, the prevalence of 
internal party conflict in the Westminster system, the shifting balance of power in the 
governing Conservative party, and the polarising dynamics of the referendum in shifting 
opinion in a rightward direction (e.g. Allen, 2018; Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; 
Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). But these cannot account for the extent of Cameron and 
May’s Euroscepticism during the talks, nor their subsequent abandonment of these posi-
tions, nor can they fully explain why criticism of both leaders focused so heavily on their 
failure to gain leverage over Brussels.
This article argues that to understand the hardening of preferences accompanying the 
Brexit process, we need to examine how the United Kingdom’s negotiating strategy con-
tributed to change at the domestic level. Drawing on the literature on two-level games, it 
argues that successive British leaders deployed ‘synergistic’ strategies involving the 
instrumental use of domestic constraints in order to overcome their diminished bargain-
ing power vis-à-vis the EU. These strategies involved the manipulation of key facets of 
the domestic political environment, including the shaping of the domestic discourse and 
the establishment of decision-moments, while also producing unintended consequences 
at the domestic level, ratcheting up hard Brexit sentiment among Leave supporters. These 
effects took on a path-dependent quality, not only because they consistently pushed 
towards a more Eurosceptic position, but also because subsequent events – the 2016 ref-
erendum and the rejection of May’s Withdrawal Agreement – prevented any recourse to 
previously ‘softer’ positions. Understanding the role of negotiating strategies in shaping 
domestic politics helps us to account for the shifting positions of Cameron and May in 
relation to their domestic detractors and to explain how the vision for Brexit gradually 
hardened over the course of the talks. Theoretically, the Brexit example highlights the 
distinct ways in which synergistic strategies can bring about unintended consequences for 
leaders, which can come back to haunt them at later stages.
The Brexit puzzle
It is perhaps a truism to note that the Brexit process, which has unfolded over the past few 
years in the United Kingdom, comprised a series of unexpected developments. Even 
before the United Kingdom voted to leave, then prime minister David Cameron’s com-
mitment to an in/out referendum on the country’s EU membership was regarded by many 
observers as a rather drastic solution to the domestic pressures on Cameron and his desire 
to safeguard the United Kingdom’s position within the EU (Matthijs, 2013; Oliver, 2017). 
The subsequent victory of the Leave campaign in the 23 June 2016 referendum by 51.9% 
of the British electorate confounded the expectations of observers and pollsters alike and 
was widely regarded as a seismic and unexpected event, as indeed it still is (Sobolewska 
and Ford, 2020: 219). The selection of unity-candidate Theresa May as Conservative 
leader and prime minister in the aftermath of the referendum result surprised many, as did 
her decision to pursue a hard-line and uncompromising Brexit agenda, characterised by 
hard bargaining, anti-EU rhetoric, unattainable ‘red lines’, and an outright refusal to 
negotiate with stakeholders outside of the Conservative party (Jones, 2019: 28, 40). Fast-
forward to early 2019 and the formerly hard-line May appears conciliatory compared to 
the Brexit supporters in the Conservative party and their collaborators in the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), whose opposition contributed to the defeat of May’s negotiated 
deal by the greatest margin in living memory (Baldini et al., forthcoming). And, while the 
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rise of ‘no deal’ sentiment under May’s tenure might have been considered an extreme 
position, under the premiership of Boris Johnson which succeeded her, the no deal threat 
came to characterise the prime minister’s ‘madman’ strategy of negotiating with the EU 
(Financial Times, 2021). While surprising enough in and of themselves, there is also a 
common thread to each of these key moments in the Brexit process: they are all charac-
terised by the rise of increasingly virulent Eurosceptic positions among both elites and 
pro-Brexit constituencies. Over time, and when taken together, they amount to a gradual 
hardening of the United Kingdom’s designs for Brexit.
How can we explain these changes? Existing explanations may be fitted into two dis-
tinct – though at times overlapping – categories. To begin with, there are those which see 
this shift to the right as the product of the gradual realisation in the United Kingdom that 
the preferences of Eurosceptics could only be obtained as part of a more distant relation-
ship. Since those who wished to ‘take back control’ did not wish to be subservient to EU 
rules and regulations, it makes sense that in a renegotiated settlement, softer models based 
on European Economic Area (EEA) membership, or ‘bespoke’ forms of market access 
would ultimately be rejected (Donnelly, 2018). Some observers contend Cameron was 
‘unleashing demons’ by announcing the referendum pledge precisely because the demands 
of the Brexiteers in the Conservative party could not be easily mollified (Oliver, 2017). 
Others have focused on the role of specific pledges at key points, such as May’s articula-
tion of the ‘red lines’ in her Lancaster House speech, in laying the ground for a harder 
Brexit (Schnapper, 2021: 372), while scholars focusing on the negotiations have empha-
sised the role of British misperceptions and the asymmetric balance of power in preclud-
ing British designs on a softer and more ‘bespoke’ Brexit outcome (Fabbrini, 2019; 
Figueira and Martill, 2020; Jones, 2019; Larsén and Khorana, 2020; Martill and Staiger, 
2021; Schnapper, 2021).
Then there are those works which ascribe the tendency towards a harder Brexit to 
dynamics inherent in the British political system. It has been argued that the referendum 
itself, for instance, unleashed polarising dynamics by vastly increasing the salience of the 
EU question and subsuming pre-existing social and political conflicts under the Brexit 
umbrella (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020: 218). Others have conceptualised Brexit as a ‘rev-
olutionary moment’ in which high levels of uncertainty regarding the eventual outcome 
created pressures for the radicalisation of opinion on both sides of the debate (Rogers, 
2019). Moreover, the Westminster system reinforces this polarisation, since the principal 
fault-lines are located within, not between, the United Kingdom’s broad-based political 
parties (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020). Still others have focused on the internal sources 
of political change within the Conservative party, as well as the continued threat of Farage 
on the Eurosceptic right (Bale, 2018; Kettell and Kerr, 2020; Lynch and Whitaker, 2018). 
And party positions may be easily linked to the positions of leaders, as is the case with 
explanations for May’s hard bargaining, many of which have focused on her status as an 
insecure Remainer and her fear of being deposed by the party right (e.g. Allen, 2018; 
Schnapper, 2021).
While both approaches highlight significant dynamics which have influenced the Brexit 
process, there remain key gaps in our understanding, which cannot be explained either by the 
inherent contradictions or by Brexit or changes in post-referendum domestic politics alone. 
We do not understand, for instance, why leaders like Cameron and May articulated positions 
more akin to those of their detractors on the right of the party during the negotiations and why 
they subsequently sought to row back from these positions. Not only were Cameron and May 
surprisingly convincing Eurosceptics, but they were also subject to ever-growing criticism 
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from within their own ranks as their respective negotiations progressed. Nor do we under-
stand why political opponents would castigate both leaders on the basis not of their reform 
proposals per se, but rather of their perceived failure in the negotiations. Throughout the 
talks, pro-Brexit constituencies maintained that ‘taking back control’ was not incompatible 
with access to the EU single market, chastising leaders for their failure to push the EU into 
making this concession. In other words, existing approaches cannot fully explain the 
dynamic nature of the Brexit process, nor how the demands of the negotiations and the 
domestic political environment have interacted over time.
Synergistic bargaining and domestic change
This article draws on insights from two-level games approaches to international negotia-
tions to show how, in the absence of alternative forms of leverage, successive leaders 
tried to use the strength of domestic Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom as leverage 
vis-à-vis Brussels, exacerbating these forces without obtaining meaningful change. The 
literature on two-level games depicts leaders in international negotiations as occupying a 
space between two inter-linked ‘games’ at the domestic and international levels, respec-
tively (Putnam, 1988). Because what is possible to achieve externally may not coincide 
with what is possible domestically, and vice versa, leaders often need to engage in ‘syn-
ergistic’ strategies that link together these games in order to bring both win-sets closer 
together. By citing domestic constraints to external audiences and external constraints to 
domestic audiences, leaders can shift outcomes in both domains in their favour (Putnam, 
1988: 446–447). Moreover, since citing domestic constraints can increase bargaining lev-
erage at the international level, leaders are known to engage in the ‘instrumental manipu-
lation of domestic win sets to increase [their] bargaining power’ (Caporaso, 1997: 568). 
Such strategies may be especially effective where other forms of leverage are absent, such 
as under highly asymmetric bargaining conditions in which defection may be perceptibly 
costlier for the smaller party (e.g. Kroll and Leuffen, 2016).
Strategies aimed at establishing – and invoking – domestic constraints can take many 
forms. Leaders can establish audience costs by publicly committing themselves to a spe-
cific position (e.g. Debs and Weiss, 2016; Tomz, 2007: 821; Weeks, 2008). They can 
outsource ratification decisions to domestic constituents through parliamentary votes, 
referendums, or general elections where it is within their power to do so (e.g. König and 
Hug, 2000: 102; Zahariadis, 2017: 688). They can also manipulate the nature of the deci-
sion-moment to suit their needs by altering the timing, the presentation of alternatives 
(Slapin, 2006: 55), the threshold for ratification (König and Hug, 2000; Tarar, 2005: 405), 
and the boundaries of the (s)electorate (e.g. Hug and Schulz, 2007: 178; Schoppa, 1993: 
354, 384). And they can engage in public diplomacy in order to shift domestic preferences 
such that they fit the requirements of the negotiations and the decision-moment (e.g. 
Caporaso, 1997; Putnam, 1988). In other words, by shaping the discourse in certain ways 
and tying their hands at key moments, leaders can make more credible any threats issued 
to other parties in the negotiations. But synergistic strategies are risky and are not guaran-
teed to work (Hug and Schulz, 2007: 178–179). If the threat is not sufficiently plausible 
(Janusch, 2018), if the constraints are easy to wiggle out of (Hix, 2002; Snyder and 
Borghard, 2011), if the government is too transparent in its game-playing (Caporaso, 
1997; Zahariadis, 2017), or if domestic signals convey contrary information on the gov-
ernment’s intentions (Schultz, 1998), then negotiating partners may be unconvinced 
about the efficacy of the threatened outcome.
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Moreover, synergistic strategic can introduce problems at the domestic level, which are 
unexpected at the time the strategy is initially articulated. Not only can they inadvertently 
increase support for the underlying threat among the population, but they can also inflate 
expectations about the likelihood of an agreement being reached (e.g. Larsén and Khorana, 
2020). And they can undermine leaders’ ability to sell a negotiated agreement by produc-
ing negative visuals of ‘concessions’ back home while also establishing vague and easily 
manipulable standards for what counts as a ‘good deal’, which can subsequently be co-
opted by political opponents. These domestic changes can easily come back to haunt lead-
ers, either at the ratification stage or in future political events. Leaders may also find that 
efforts to make credible a threatened outcome increases domestic support for a threatened 
outcome faster than it increases the credibility of this outcome among external observers, 
increasing the risk of involuntary defection (Putnam, 1988: 453). Moreover, if sufficient 
conditions are not obtained, then the threatened outcome can itself come to be seen as a test 
of credibility, quite independent of how desirable it was in the first place. While significant 
decisions may therefore be initiated primarily as a display of resolve, once taken it can 
often be very difficult to return to the pre-decision status quo.
Methodology
The remainder of this article sets out the empirical basis of the theoretical argument 
offered above by discussing the use of synergistic strategies by both David Cameron and 
Theresa May in their respective negotiations with the EU. The empirical analysis shows 
that both leaders – finding themselves without alternative sources of leverage vis-à-vis 
the EU – sought to convince European leaders to compromise on fundamental principles 
by emphasising the strength of domestic opposition to the status quo and the ability of 
domestic actors to veto any sub-par agreement. More than merely reporting these con-
cerns, both leaders actively encouraged them in their rhetoric and in their choices about 
what the decision-making process would look like. The analysis shows that while both 
leaders were unsuccessful in convincing European leaders these threats were credible, 
they did unintentionally succeed in raising support among Eurosceptics for a less com-
promising outcome. Unable to argue against positions they themselves had introduced 
into the discourse, both leaders found their negotiated agreements defeated on behalf of 
those constituencies within their own party which they had sought to deploy as bargaining 
leverage.
The empirical basis of the research covers Cameron’s renegotiation attempt over the 
course of 2015/2016 and the subsequent in/out referendum in 2016, as well as May’s 
effort to deliver Brexit from her ascension to the premiership in July 2016 to her resigna-
tion in July 2019. The article draws on the publicly available literature on the Brexit 
negotiations, including biographies of the leading figures involved, to build the narratives 
for the cases. These follow a process-tracing approach that adopts a partially selective 
focus on those aspects of the negotiations highlighted by the theoretical framework. In 
other words, the cases follow the articulation of the negotiating strategies, how leaders 
invoke domestic considerations, and the ways in which the negotiations feed back into 
domestic positions. Both cases show similar dynamics can be observed during the tenures 
of Cameron and May while allowing for the acknowledgement of relevant differences. 
Moreover, by covering two consecutive time periods, they allow us to observe how these 
processes contributed to the rise of a more uncompromising position among Brexit 
supporters.
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The findings corroborate the principal assertions, made in the theoretical section 
above, that leaders attempted to leverage domestic constraints, that they actively colluded 
in supporting Eurosceptic arguments and stringent conditions for the EU to meet, and that 
their interactions with European leaders involved concerted efforts to play up the veracity 
of these constraints. The findings also suggest that these actions helped bring about 
changes in the domestic political environment, that the hardening of opinion made it more 
difficult for the leaders to sell their deals, and that this contributed to the eventual out-
come of ‘involuntary defection’. That the observable implications of the theory can be 
demonstrated empirically does not preclude the validity of alternative explanations, but it 
does suggest that negotiating strategies did have a significant role to play alongside other 
factors in bringing about the gradual shift towards a harder Brexit.
David Cameron’s renegotiation and referendum
In his Bloomberg Speech in January 2013, Cameron announced that a majority 
Conservative government would hold an in/out referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU 
membership. The referendum pledge was the result of several developments in British 
politics, including rising Euroscepticism on the Conservative backbenches which 
Cameron hoped the referendum would put to rest (Bale, 2018: 263; Hayton, 2018: 224) 
as well as the related rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which threatened the 
Conservative vote in general, and especially European, elections (Copsey and Haughton, 
2014: 83; Vasilopoulou and Keith, 2019: 488). But the referendum decision also reflected 
Cameron’s own concerns about the future direction of the EU and his fears that the United 
Kingdom could find itself part of a very different Union in the future, one in which non-
Eurozone members had a diminished voice and were subject to the policy preferences of 
the members of the inner-circle (e.g. Seldon and Snowdon, 2016: 261–263; Thompson, 
2017: 439). Oliver Letwin, who was instrumental in convincing Cameron of the need for 
a referendum, argued that it
seemed to me to be a very useful device to maximise the chances of getting what I wanted us to 
get from the EU. I thought that, it the leaders of other EU members states saw that we were 
heading towards an ‘in/out’ referendum in the UK, they would be more likely to give us 
protection against absorption into the euro. (Letwin, 2017: 17–18)
Both appeasing domestic detractors and solving the perceived problems with the EU 
required leverage, however, since Cameron would be asking the EU to compromise – if 
not wholly renege – on core principles of European integration, not least regarding the 
free movement of persons. And in the period following the financial crisis, leverage  was 
in short supply. The United Kingdom had obtained significant concessions on previous 
occasions because of its status quo preference, which allowed it to drag its heels at 
Treaty negotiations, precluding further integration until it obtained the desired guaran-
tees or opt-outs (Schimmelfennig, 2018: 1158). But the financial crisis had exacerbated 
fears of Britain’s status as a non-Eurozone member while simultaneously highlighting 
the ability of the rest of the EU to work around British opposition, as they had done with 
the 2011 Fiscal Compact (Thompson, 2017: 446). Moreover, there was little desire to 
re-open the Treaties – the main source of British leverage – and, even if there had been, 
the United Kingdom would have found itself requesting changes to the status quo, a 
much less powerful position. Of course, the United Kingdom could always threaten to 
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leave if it did not obtain what it wanted from the EU, but European leaders would be 
unlikely to believe that Britain would sacrifice the benefits of membership simply to 
push for piecemeal reforms.
Cameron found the solution to his lack of leverage in the referendum, since it took the 
decision on membership out of his hands and vested it in the British people, not known 
for their embrace of the normative aspects of European integration (Carl et al., 2019: 
286–289). By externalising the decision, Cameron made the prospect of exit more credi-
ble than it would be otherwise, since opinion polls showed the United Kingdom would 
likely vote to leave without reform, but that there existed a majority to remain in a 
reformed EU (Hobolt, 2016). In Cameron’s view, the renegotiation and referendum were 
‘two sides of the same coin’, and he stated in his memoirs that ‘I could never have under-
taken a proper renegotiation without a referendum. I needed that endpoint to focus the 
minds of the leaders from whom I was seeking change’ (Cameron, 2019: 622). Such a 
strategy would be familiar to theorists of negotiations as a form of hand-tying, where 
bargaining leverage comes from vesting the decision in a less compromising constitu-
ency. Of course, ostensibly tied hands can often be just as easily untied. But the subse-
quent inclusion of the referendum pledge in the 2015 manifesto (Conservative Party, 
2015), for instance, made the commitment more difficult to wriggle out of, as did the 
decision of June 2015 to place the vote on a legislative footing (Smith, 2016: 333).
Cameron also made a concerted effort to cultivate a discourse at home which sup-
ported his assertion that the United Kingdom was prepared to walk away from the EU if 
it could not obtain revised terms of membership. The prime minister repeatedly empha-
sised that he had no ‘romantic attachment to the European Union and its institutions’ 
(Kroll and Leuffen, 2016: 1311) and that the United Kingdom would ‘remain in the 
European Union so long as it is in our interest to do so’ (Copsey and Haughton, 2014: 81), 
making it clear the United Kingdom would walk away if the EU’s offer was deemed 
insubstantial (Kroll and Leuffen, 2016: 1312). Comparative research on Cameron has 
found he was more Eurosceptic in the run-up to the renegotiation than otherwise, suggest-
ing the prime minister undertook deliberate efforts to shape the discursive milieu 
(Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019a: 229–232; Seldon and Snowdon, 2016: 270). Fostering 
this discourse no doubt helped reinforce the message Cameron wished to convey to the 
EU, but such public statements also function as a form of ‘audience costs’, a tried-and-
tested tactic through which leaders can raise the domestic costs of defecting from a posi-
tion and thereby make their demands more credible (e.g. Tomz, 2007).
When Cameron began his renegotiation effort following his party’s general election 
victory on 7 May 2015, he focused heavily on conveying Britain’s resolve to exit the 
Union if new terms for membership could not be obtained. He noted that, wherever he 
went, his ‘objectives were the same. . . Insist that I was serious about securing a better 
settlement in order to keep Britain in the EU. Warn of the risks of under-delivering and 
seeing the UK exit the EU altogether’ (Cameron, 2019: 638). In conversations with 
Angela Merkel, Cameron pointed out that ‘If you force the British people to choose 
between a measure of control over who comes into the country, and staying in the EU, if 
you give them that binary choice, they will vote to leave the EU’ (Cameron, 2019: 638). 
And in a meeting with Tusk prior to the February 2016 European Council meeting, 
Cameron recalls he stated:
If the February Council denies me these things, and the whole thing breaks up, we are going to 
have to have a look at our relationship with this organisation’, I told him . . . ‘We’re the third 
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biggest contributor. We are a proud country, and if we’re treated like supplicants, then we’ll 
bugger off’. (Cameron, 2019: 642)
Cameron never succeeded in convincing other European leaders the United Kingdom 
would vote to leave. He reported:
picking up from most leaders . . . that they simply did not think Britain would leave . . . ‘They 
don’t believe we’d leave the EU over this’, one advisor wrote to me. And they really didn’t. No 
matter how much I said it. (Cameron, 2019: 641)
Jonathan Hill, the United Kingdom’s Commissioner, reported to Cameron in January 
2016 that he believed the United Kingdom was being ‘low-balled’, stating, ‘They need to 
understand that if they don’t get this right, the whole thing could unravel – with Britain 
leaving the EU’ (Oliver, 2017: 58). Several factors contributed to their scepticism. For 
one thing, European leaders were unimpressed with the timing of Cameron’s renegotia-
tion effort, coming as it did just as the EU was dealing with the fallout from the Ukraine 
and Euro crises. The leaders were conscious, too, that the United Kingdom already had 
beneficial terms of membership, with several opt-outs from core policy areas (Matthijs, 
2013: 13; Smith, 2016: 330). Exit was also viewed as a somewhat extreme – and thus 
implausible – option, even when taken out of Cameron’s hands. Merkel found it difficult 
to understand why British citizens would opt to leave, given the high economic costs 
(Cameron, 2019: 640), while Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte reportedly told Cameron 
he felt UK citizens were too conservative in disposition to leave the EU (Oliver, 2017: 
58–60). And there was a sense in which Cameron’s gamble was too transparent, since 
many leaders seemed to regard the referendum as ‘a ruse to get more out of the renegotia-
tion’ (Cameron, 2019: 641).
Cameron’s inability to convince European leaders the United Kingdom was hovering 
at the exit did not prevent him from obtaining a renegotiated basis for the United 
Kingdom’s membership, including an ‘emergency brake’ limiting access to in-work ben-
efits for EU migrants, a ‘red card’ system allowing national Parliaments to demand 
amendments to EU legislation under certain conditions, and a formal opt-out from the 
commitment to ‘ever closer union’ (Kroll and Leuffen, 2016: 1316; Smith, 2016: 333). So 
the renegotiation was not a failure, and Cameron was ‘able to claim that he had secured 
just about enough concessions to satisfy all four “baskets” of demands’ (The Economist, 
2016). But these changes were more contingent than Cameron wanted and did not fully 
address domestic concerns about migration or national sovereignty. And the domestic 
reaction was overwhelmingly negative. Cameron was castigated for having asked for too 
little, and then for having obtained less than he promised (Shipman, 2018: 10). Newspaper 
editorials claimed the deal was ‘a long way from what the PM and the Tory manifesto 
promised’ (Oliver, 2017: 77–78). Prominent Conservatives, including Cabinet ministers, 
sought to quickly distance themselves from the deal (Seldon and Snowdon, 2016: 546, 
549). And, because the deal was deemed a failure, it featured little in the ensuing referen-
dum campaign.
Cameron’s negotiating strategy, and his deployment of the referendum/renegotiation 
combination, did much to change the political environment in the United Kingdom 
throughout the period. To begin with, the referendum announcement itself galvanised 
Eurosceptic parties and organisations, whose reach was amplified by Cameron’s own 
Eurosceptic rhetoric and by his deliberate efforts to increase the salience of the question 
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of Britain’s EU membership. It also mobilised new constituencies who had not voted in 
previous elections owing to the lack of perceived choice between the major parties 
(Goodwin and Heath, 2016: 325). Moreover, the referendum created clear opportunities 
for Conservatives seeking to challenge Cameron, given the Eurosceptic credentials of 
much of the party membership base, meaning that even nominally pro-Remain 
Conservatives had a strong incentive to oppose Cameron’s renegotiated agreement 
(Seldon and Snowdon, 2016: 548). The defection of prominent individuals from 
Cameron’s camp – like Johnson and Michael Gove – would prove to be highly damaging 
in the referendum campaign, since they helped mobilise citizens ‘that Nigel Farage 
couldn’t reach: the sensible, middle-of-the-road voters’ (Letwin, 2017: 25).
And Cameron’s rhetorical EU bashing would prove equally problematic as he tried to 
sell his renegotiated terms of membership to the British public. For one thing, Cameron 
had given Eurosceptics many of their best arguments by highlighting the flaws of the EU 
and the unsuitability of the status quo for the United Kingdom. He had also succeeded in 
reinforcing the notion that the United Kingdom required – and indeed could have – a new 
and exceptional basis for membership under the existing EU Treaties. Cameron’s demands 
had been deliberately vague, to calibrate them to what the EU might offer (Kroll and 
Leuffen, 2016: 1315), and this vagueness acted as a double-edged sword because it 
allowed others to suggest that the price of continued membership had not been met 
(Seldon and Snowdon, 2016: 546). Cameron also found it difficult to credibly defend the 
EU after so many months of spelling out its weaknesses. ‘Our enthusiasm for the Remain 
case could easily be questioned’, he noted: ‘After all, we had shifted very quickly from 
“big, bossy and interfering” negativity to “stronger, safer and better off” positivity. We 
were asking a lot of people to believe such a handbrake turn’ (Cameron, 2019: 665).
The clear lack of enthusiasm for Cameron’s renegotiation and the success of the Leave 
campaign at mobilising British citizens ultimately contributed to the Leave victory of 
51.9% in the referendum on 23 June 2016. While a great many factors need to be taken 
into account to explain the Leave victory (Clarke et al., 2017; Sobolewska and Ford, 
2020), the marginality of the result means that any factor – including Cameron’s 
Eurosceptic rhetoric – can be considered partially responsible for tilting the result towards 
exit. Interestingly, one of the reasons given by several prominent ‘converts’ to the Brexit 
cause, like Boris Johnson, was that voting ‘Leave’ was the only way to show the EU that 
Britain was serious about walking away leaving (Cameron, 2019: 654). Several Cabinet 
members felt Cameron had not worked hard enough to convince the EU that Britain really 
was prepared to walk away (Shipman, 2018: 10) and reasoned that ‘if we vote out, the EU 
will come running with proper concessions and a far better deal. In other words, they 
don’t think a vote to Leave is a vote to leave’ (Oliver, 2017: 96–97). The return to the 
negotiating table would never happen, since the Brexit result changed the game so signifi-
cantly, precluding a simple return to the pre-referendum status quo. But it is instructive 
that Cameron’s failure to convince European leaders exit was a realistic possibility would, 
quite independently, motivate prominent individuals to promote a leave vote purely as a 
demonstration of resolve.
Theresa May’s Brexit negotiations
Cameron resigned following the referendum result, his position untenable. In his place, 
Theresa May emerged as Conservative leader and Prime Minister. A compromise candi-
date and pragmatist, May had also been a Remain supporter, if a quiet one, and sought to 
10 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
focus her premiership on delivering on the mandate established in the referendum (Allen, 
2018: 108). May wanted Brexit to be delivered swiftly and in a meaningful way, but she 
was also keen for existing trade and security ties not to be undone in the process. Thus, 
her Brexit strategy focused on obtaining the greatest possible market access compatible 
with the return of key competences to the United Kingdom, including control over migra-
tion, and the renunciation of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. This search 
for a ‘bespoke’ deal would put May at odds with the EU’s existing balance of rights and 
obligations for members and non-members, but also with the political interests of the 
EU27 post-Brexit, who were squarely focused on avoiding the risk of contagion, safe-
guarding core EU principles, and precluding the emergence of a bespoke ‘UK model’ of 
association (Laffan, 2019: 14). But the prime minister disregarded reports from her advi-
sors that a bespoke deal would never fly and was reportedly ‘sick of people saying to me 
that we can’t go for an ambitious new Brexit model designed around the UK’s interests 
and needs (Seldon, 2019: 100).
May’s aims were not all that different from Cameron’s in seeking to maintain the eco-
nomic underpinnings of EU membership but to de-link this from specific political com-
mitments, including free movement. While Cameron attempted to negotiate such an 
arrangement from within, and along more conservative lines, May sought to do so from 
without and as part of a new model of external association (Figueira and Martill, 2020). 
And, like her predecessor, May lacked leverage over the EU. Since the United Kingdom 
was leaving, there was no goodwill, no solidarity (Rogers, 2019), and a vastly diminished 
‘shadow of the future’, with Britain’s time in the EU ending and very little reason to con-
cede anything to the soon-to-be former member state. Her response was to follow a simi-
lar strategy to Cameron by seeking to deploy the United Kingdom’s resolve to walk away 
from the negotiations – the ‘no deal’ Brexit outcome – as leverage in the talks. Indeed, the 
threat of ‘no deal’ was a core component of May’s ‘hard bargaining’ stance which emerged 
over the course of early 2017 (Martill and Staiger, 2021: 263). While Cameron’s strategy 
had failed spectacularly, May was among those who believed her predecessor had not 
gone far enough in convincing the EU of Britain’s willingness to walk away. The key les-
son she took from Cameron’s experience was ‘to at least look like you were prepared to 
walk away from the talks to maximise leverage’ (Shipman, 2018: 10). This was not just 
May’s view, but was shared also by her ministers, one of whom remarked that ‘David 
Cameron’s mistake when he was negotiating before the referendum was that the Europeans 
never thought we would walk away. This time we will’ (Shipman, 2018: 97).
While a ‘no deal’ Brexit would damage the United Kingdom, it would damage the EU, 
too. Hence, if the EU could be reassured the outcome was inevitable, Britain – so it was 
believed – should gain at least some leverage (Schnapper, 2021). May’s rhetoric was 
carefully crafted to reinforce the message that the United Kingdom would walk away if it 
did not get what it wanted (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2019b). Among her many stock 
phrases, ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’ gained prominence and notoriety, committing 
the United Kingdom to a ‘no deal’ scenario if it did not obtain a favourable deal from the 
EU. The phrase’s author, advisor Nick Timothy, crafted it ‘in order to impress on the EU 
that May was prepared to cut and run if she did not get what she wanted’ (Shipman, 2018: 
96). May did not engage explicitly in hand-tying, as Cameron had done by locking in the 
referendum pledge. But she did seek to leverage the Article 50 process, which established 
a two-year time limit for negotiating the terms of withdrawal, following which the United 
Kingdom would crash out of the Union. May did not design this process, and she had 
other good reasons for initiating it when she did – the EU refused to begin talks until 
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notification of the intent to withdraw had been given – but in establishing a no deal Brexit 
as the reversion point, it essentially removed all domestic barriers to this outcome. May’s 
message to Brussels, backed up implicitly by the Article 50 process, was that unless she 
could obtain a deal that would satisfy Eurosceptics in her party, the United Kingdom 
would leave without a deal. To that end, May went to considerable effort to forestall 
domestic attempts to take ‘no deal’ off the table, on the explicit rationale that to do so 
would undermine the United Kingdom’s leverage in the talks (Martill, 2021).
May’s attempt to leverage the risk of a ‘no deal’ Brexit was unsuccessful, forcing the 
prime minister into a series of humiliating climb-downs during 2018 as she assented to 
EU proposals on the terms of withdrawal (Jones, 2019: 44–45; Schnapper, 2021). There 
are many reasons why May’s negotiating strategy was unsuccessful. Certainly, the prime 
minister struggled to make her ‘no deal’ threat credible. The asymmetry of effects was so 
significant (Hix, 2018: 14–15; Jones, 2019: 38) that few in Brussels took her claim seri-
ously. Juncker’s chief of staff, Martin Selmayr, claimed the EU ‘never saw no deal under 
May as a credible threat’ (Seldon, 2019: 119). Moreover, talk of ‘no deal’ spooked busi-
ness and other domestic constituencies who had been promised minimal disruption 
(Seldon, 2019: 417), and for this reason it was decided that any preparation for ‘no deal’ 
should be undertaken only at ‘the last possible moment’ (Shipman, 2018: 515). But May 
faced a deeper problem in having fundamentally misread the EU’s interests, especially 
when it came to protecting the principles of the single market (Figueira and Martill, 
2020). With Brussels less susceptible to no deal than the United Kingdom, and happier to 
see the United Kingdom crash out than sacrifice the single market, even if the no deal 
threat were to be made credible, it would not have afforded May the kind of Brexit deal 
she sought. But while it would be true to say May’s ‘no deal’ threat would never be suf-
ficient to obtain the kind of concessions the prime minister sought, this did not prevent 
her from articulating such a strategy, nor would it preclude the consequences of empha-
sising the viability of ‘no deal’.
One of the most significant consequences of May’s uncompromising Eurosceptic rhet-
oric was the role it played in hardening preferences among the Leave supporters within 
the Conservative party. While May was initially concerned more with the threat from 
Remain supporters (Timothy, 2020: 17–18), by mid-2018 it became clear the greatest 
opposition to her deal within the Conservative party was on the pro-Brexit right, who 
began to desert the prime minister when it became clear she would settle for less than the 
‘red lines’ she initially set out (Schnapper, 2021; Shipman, 2018: 484). Support for May’s 
negotiated agreement drained away gradually over the course of the negotiations as the 
divergence between her stated aims and what she managed to negotiate became clearer. 
May’s Chequers Plan of July precipitated the resignations of Brexit Secretary David 
Davis and Foreign Secretary Johnson while further undermining backbencher trust in the 
government (Seldon, 2019: 420, 446). By November 2018, when the terms of the deal 
were agreed, Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab, Davis’ replacement, declared the agree-
ment to be ‘Brexit In Name Only’ (BRINO), fatally undermining May’s trust among 
backbenchers, one of whom described the deal as a ‘Hotel California Brexit deal which 
ensures we can never truly leave the EU’ (Seldon, 2019: 494).
May’s embrace of ‘no deal’ as a possible – even desirable – outcome contributed to the 
growth in support for this outcome, such that it became the majority position among 
Leave supporters over the course of the negotiations (Kettell and Kerr, 2020: 598). By 
interpreting the Brexit mandate in an uncompromising manner, May set high expectations 
at home which could not be delivered from Brussels (Larsén and Khorana, 2020), making 
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her effort seem not just a failure, but also one that fell clearly short of the ‘red lines’ estab-
lished for a meaningful Brexit. The optics of an ostensibly strong United Kingdom being 
forced into concession after concession further increased Eurosceptic ire, with frequent 
assertions Britain was being ‘bullied’ by Brussels, even though London’s demands were 
never likely to be met (Martill and Staiger, 2021: 263). The vagueness of May’s demands, 
especially when it came to the much-vaunted ‘good deal’, also made it easy for political 
opponents to claim May’s deal was a ‘bad one’, thereby co-opting her rhetoric in order to 
oppose her negotiated agreement (Kettell and Kerr, 2020: 605). In fact, May’s shift to the 
right in her rhetoric only forced would-be detractors to move further to the right in order 
to oppose her deal, such that by the time of May’s eventual replacement in July 2019, the 
most significant issue was the openness of candidates to a ‘no deal’ Brexit. And May 
found it difficult – as Cameron had before her – to switch from her uncompromising 
rhetoric into the more conciliatory discourse required to defend her agreement and sell the 
virtues of institutionalised cooperation with the EU.
While Brussels insiders insisted that ‘no deal’ was never credible, and was in any case 
an outcome they were prepared for, many of May’s Cabinet colleagues were convinced 
that May had not conveyed the message forcefully enough (Seldon, 2019: 485). Gove and 
Davis both wrote to May in late 2017 complaining about the lack of no deal planning and 
urging a tougher approach (Shipman, 2018: 515). In late 2018, Raab reportedly told May 
to: ‘Go back, be tougher’, and even middle-ground Cabinet colleagues argued she ‘needed 
to be tougher with the EU to get what Britain needed, as Thatcher had been’ (Seldon, 
2019: 485–487). Jeremy Hunt would later claim that ‘Brussels was terrified of no deal 
happening’, attributing May’s lack of concessions to her last-minute willingness to take 
no deal off the table (Seldon, 2019: 575). Such was the belief that the United Kingdom 
had failed to convey its resolve to walk away that support emerged at the highest level for 
doing just that in order to show how serious Britain was. May herself endorsed the view, 
at various times, that ‘if the Bill was defeated . . . it would send a powerful message to 
the EU that she had tried and been rebuffed’ (Seldon, 2019: 515). Meanwhile, members 
of the Cabinet, including Gove, endorsed the view that the United Kingdom might leave 
without a deal in order to return subsequently to the negotiating table having demon-
strated its willingness to walk away (Seldon, 2019: 496).
In the end, on 15 January 2019, the Withdrawal Agreement Bill was rejected by 432 to 
202, a margin of defeat not encountered by a sitting prime minister since the 19th century. 
Following exploratory talks with the opposition, May whipped her party to support the 
‘Brady Amendment’, sponsored by Sir Graham Brady, the chair of the 1922 Committee 
of backbench Conservative MPs, which envisaged the replacement of the Northern Ireland 
‘backstop’ with alternative measures, requiring the prime minister to return to Brussels to 
request changes. May’s support for the amendment, which opposed the agreement she 
herself had negotiated, offers a good example of the anticipated benefits of allying with 
the domestic hardliners to try to obtain further leverage in the talks (Bercow, 2020: 377), 
although Brussels was unwilling to offer anything other than further ‘assurances’. A sec-
ond vote took place on 12 March and saw the deal defeated again by 391 to 242, prompt-
ing the prime minister to seek a temporary extension to Article 50 on 20 March prior to 
the third vote, held on 29 March, which also saw the prime minister defeated, albeit by a 
smaller margin than previously (344 to 286). This third defeat fatally undermined May’s 
authority, and following abortive talks with the Labour party, the prime minister commit-
ted on 24 May to resigning, finally handing over to Johnson on 24 July following the 
Conservative leadership election. While efforts to use the rejection of the Withdrawal 
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Agreement to push for better terms had repeatedly failed, Johnson’s selection as the hard-
line candidate of choice offered no opportunity for re-thinking the United Kingdom’s 
strategy, once again ratcheting up the demands of Brexit supporters and their belief that 
Britain’s willingness to walk away would provide the key to getting more out of Brussels.
Conclusion
Britain’s negotiations with the EU, which have dominated British public life for the better 
part of five years, have witnessed a concerted and ever-more surprising shift to the right 
as opportunities for compromise or softer variants of Brexit have fallen by the wayside. 
Existing explanations have focused on the incompatibility between British designs on 
Europe and core principles of integration as a factor pushing the country into a more dis-
tant model of association as well as the tendency of the United Kingdom’s political sys-
tem to foster polarisation and a hardening of preferences on Europe. But these perspectives 
cannot by themselves account for the complex pattern of interaction between elites and 
their more hard-line detractors, nor for the specific times at which Eurosceptic concerns 
have become more influential. This article argued that to understand the gradual harden-
ing of the United Kingdom’s demands from Brexit, we need to acknowledge the impact 
successive negotiating strategies have had at the domestic level. Drawing on two-level 
games accounts of ‘synergistic’ bargaining strategies which seek to deploy domestic con-
straints as bargaining leverage, we can observe how both Cameron and May alike sought 
to co-opt the preferences of Eurosceptics into their bargaining strategy and understand the 
effects this had on the politics of Brexit over time.
Analysis of both premierships highlights a number of similarities. Both leaders sought 
to negotiate exceptions to the balance of rights and obligations that come with access to 
the EU single market, first as a member (Cameron) and then as a non-member (May). 
And, finding themselves without forms of leverage the United Kingdom had previously 
enjoyed, both leaders sought instead to threaten British exit, initially from the EU 
(Cameron) and later through a ‘no deal’ Brexit (May). Since both actions would impose 
asymmetric costs on the United Kingdom, both leaders relied heavily on domestic con-
straints which they themselves had encouraged throughout the negotiations, in order to 
convince the EU the decision was not theirs to take. While Cameron tied himself to the 
referendum result, May made every effort to keep ‘no deal’ on the table in the talks, 
before eventually citing her own deal’s repeated defeat as evidence of domestic intracta-
bility. Neither succeeded in convincing the EU that the threat of walking away was cred-
ible. But they did both succeed in exacerbating Eurosceptic sentiment domestically, 
giving credence to arguments on the right, undermining their own ability to promote 
cooperation with Brussels, establishing clear incentives for political opponents to out-
flank them, and building unrealistic expectations which were easily quashed. Not only 
did they increase support for outcomes they hoped to avoid, they also created a situation 
in which these outcomes became the only perceived means of demonstrating British cred-
ibility. And, once taken, these decisions could not be easily undone. Thus did the Brexit 
process ramp up alongside the perceived gap in credibility, as Cabinet colleagues urged 
first a Leave vote and then, in later years, rejection of the Withdrawal Agreement, to show 
the United Kingdom was ‘serious’.
What, then, is the value of conceptualising Brexit as a failed negotiating strategy? 
First, it helps us to understand the positions of leaders better, including their reasons for 
cultivating a more Eurosceptic discourse than was initially expected of them, as well as 
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their subsequent shift into a more cooperative register. Second, it helps us understand the 
curious alliance between Conservative Eurosceptics and their more moderate party lead-
ers when it comes to undertaking efforts to improve the credibility of the threat that the 
United Kingdom would ‘walk away’. Third, the argument helps explain how the negotia-
tions contributed to the ratcheting up of the Brexit process over the years, as efforts to 
negotiate with the EU produced uncompromising narratives which would come to shape 
the domestic political milieu. Overall, the picture that emerges is one in which the Brexit 
outcome is more accidental than intentional, as positions designed for negotiating lever-
age have turned into preferences and as events undertaken to bolster the credibility of 
threats have become locked in. From this perspective, the current Brexit outcome is little 
more than a freak accident brought about by the sustained failure of the United Kingdom’s 
strategy for reforming the EU.
The broader theoretical implications of the study are twofold. To begin with, the argu-
ment highlights the diverse range of unintended consequences which the use of synergis-
tic strategies can have at the domestic level, spelling out the distinct mechanisms through 
which leaders’ attempts to instrumentally utilise domestic constraints in the international 
game can backfire. While the potential for domestic backlash has, for sure, been acknowl-
edged in existing studies of two-level games (e.g. Evans, 1993), the variety of mecha-
nisms through which leaders can establish (negative) feedback remains underexplored, 
not least because domestic change is part-and-parcel of synergistic strategies. The study’s 
findings also highlight the importance of recognising the temporal dynamics across inter-
linked negotiations, showing how the preferences fostered and lessons learned in one set 
of negotiations may come to inform subsequent negotiations in such a way as to produce 
path-dependent processes which span multiple sets of talks. In this way are the lessons of 
Brexit relevant to broader debates on international bargaining as well as to the calculus of 
leaders contemplating the tried-and-tested (but far from risk-free) manipulation of domes-
tic win-sets for bargaining advantage.
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